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NOTES
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: IMMUNITY FRoM TORT LIABILITY.-In a recent Penn-
sylvania 1 case plaintiff, a pedestrian and "stranger," fell on a negligently maintained
sidewalk which abutted premises owned by the charitable Society of St. Vincent
de Paul. A state statute2 provided that municipal authorities might require sidewalks
to, be kept in repair, and if the property owner failed to do so the municipality might
do the necessary work and assess the cost thereof upon the property. The city of
Pittsburgh had also passed an enabling ordinance 3 which imposed a duty of repair
on every abutting property owner. Frances Bond brought suit against the municipality
to recover for her injury and the municipality of Pittsburgh joined the Society of
St. Vincent de Paul as additional defendant. Upon judgment for plaintiff, the society
was granted judgment in their favor, non obstante verdicto, and the municipality
appealed from both judgments. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with dissent,
held that "the doctrine of immunity of charitable organizations from tort liability
includes actions of assumpsit brought by a municipality under a claim of indemnity
as well as tort actions brought by injured persons."
The doctrine of charitable immunity itself is usually voiced as follows: "It would
be against all law and all equity to take those trust funds, so contributed for a special,
charitable purpose, to compensate injuries inflicted or occasioned by the negligence
of the agents or servants of the (charity)."
"In this way the trust fund might be entirely destroyed and diverted from the
purposes for which the donor gave it." 5
Particular notice should be made of the emphasis placed upon frustration of
donor's intention, and this language should be contrasted with the language as used
by Lord Cottenham in Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross:6 "To give damages out
of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund
had in view, but would divert it to a completely different purpose."
At first reading the words sound alike, but, when the background of Lord Cotten-
ham's decision is examined, the words will be seen to frame a picture concerning the
nature of the trust fund, and not one of donor's intent. Professor McCaskill7 has
pointed out that Lord Cottenham in the Heriot's Hospital case, after citing many cases
wherein governmental agencies were held to be not liable, held that the trustees were
not liable in their corporate character. The particular case used by Lord Cottenham
in his decision, Duncan v. Findlater,8 held that a public fund for maintenance of
highways was not liable for tortious injury. Lord Cottenhram was basing his decision
on the ground that Heriot's Hospital Trust was a public fund.9
'Bond et a]. v. City of Pittsburgh, 84 A.2d 328 (Pa., 1951).
'Act of May 16, 1891, P.L. 75, § 11, 53 P.S., § 771.
'Ordinance of Pittsburgh of 1930, No. 161.
'Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd et al., 120 Pa. 624, 15 Aut. 553, 557 (1888).
'Gable eta]. v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 AtI. 1087 (1910).
8[1846] 12 Clark & Fin. 507,513, 8 Eng.Rep. 1508.
"0. L. McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied in New York to Quasi-Public and Elee-
mosynary Corporations, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 409, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 56 (1921).
"(1839] 6 Clark & Fin. (Eng.) 894.
""[The trust] differed from the funds in the hands of public agents in that they had a private
origin, but after the dedication this private characteristic, if it had not disappeared entirely, was
at least subordinated to the public interest, and the origin was immaterial." Supra note 7,
6 CORNELL L.Q. 56, 65 (1921).
But cf. Lester W. Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U.PA.L.txv. 191 (1928): "This
immunity of charities from liability is one of several immunities from liability which remain in
the law of torts as the modern heritage of the Georgian and Victorian period of English juris-
prudence, . . . the class-conscious thought of the bench, bar and legislature . . . ruled England
and formed the pattern for both English and American legal development.
(147)
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Further, an examination of Mersey Docks & Harbor Trustees v. Gibbs,'0 the
case which purportedly repudiates Lord Cottenham's "trust fund" doctrine, in light
of the McCaskill analysis, did not in actuality repudiate Lord Cottenham, but repudi-
ates the interpretation of Heriot's Hospital as employed by the courts which followed
the lead of McDonald v. Mass. Genl. Hosp.1 1 Mersey Docks was found to be a private
trading company and not a public fund.
The present English position of holding charitable trusts liable in torts is clearly
seen in Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital.12 This case enunciated the position
which is followed in the Empire,13 as well as in at least three American jurisdictions.
14
California'5 is probably the latest of the American jurisdictions to follow this position,
which is characterized as the modern trend.
American authorities, as a whole, are split into three principal groups: Absolute
immunity, partial immunity, absolute liability. Of the three groups, the first and the
last are composed of a relatively small number of states, while the preponderance of
states is to be found in the second group which proclaims a partial immunity. The
utter confusion of the decisions coming from this group stems from the fact that
discovery of a sound basis for immunity is quite nebulous, and from the fact that the
constricting coils of stare decisis at times present a formidable prison.',
It is doubtful that any rule of full-immunity ever represented the prevailing state
of decision in this country. 17 Immunity has disappeared largely as to all persons
and classes of claimants save one, the so-called beneficiary-of-the-charity class. Never-
theless, judicial discussion has established the pattern of immunity as the rule.
Such discussion, in the first instance, fails to recognize that immunity is itself an
exception to the general rule of liability for tortious conduct.
In essence, the problem resolves itself into one involving two conflicting public
policies. Public policy, on the one hand, seeks to protect and encourage charities,
while, on the other hand, it is important to prevent any loss of earning power and
property in the case of individuals and their families.' 8
In those jurisdictions whose public policy indicates that there should be at least
a partial immunity, one finds language that immunity is extended because of defend-
ant's charitable character, that there is a "trust fund" immunity, that respondeat
superior is inapplicable to charitable institutions, that public policy favors immunity,
that there is an implied waiver, and that the institution is imbued with a public interest
10[1866] L.R. 1, H.L. 93.
"See note 10 supra.
"120 Mass. 432 (1876) ; [19091 2 K.B. 820.
"See cases collected in Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 123
(1942).
"Okla., Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 82 P.2d 996, 183 Okla. 454 (1938), (paying
patient).
N.Y., Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital & Dispensary, 283 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940),
(patient).
N.H., Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939), (patient) -
"Calif., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951), (beneficiary).
""Each modification has the justification that it is a step in result, if not in reason, from the
original error toward eventual correction." Rutledge, J., supra note 13, at page 827; Bruce v.
Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
"Note that at the time when McDonald v. Mass. Genl. Hosp., supra note 11, was adopting
a doctrine of immunity, the courts of Rhode Island, in Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411
(1879), severely criticized the McDonald decision and returned a contrary result, saying that public
policy also had an interest in obliging every person and every corporation which undertakes the
performance of a duty to perform it carefully.
"BOCERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 401 (1st ed., 1935).
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in the performance of sovereign junctions. All, save the last, of these enunciations,
however, are seen to be the same doctrine with but a different name. They are the
"trust fund" theory of immunity. This doctrine comprehends all that is contained as
basis for all the others.' 9 Of the last enunciation, sovereign junction, more will be
said below.
The very case which first spoke of implied waiver, Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic
Hospital,2" a federal case, also raised another doctrine, the doctrine of negligent
selection of servants. Whatever may have been the reason for employing the disguise
of implied waiver to maintain an immunity, waiver by implication is obviously
contrary to the general law applicable to both contracts and torts. These are the
doctrines, however, which have been adopted by a large number of the western
jurisdictions. 21
The federal courts, at various times, have been involved in this question of
charitable immunity, and it is significant to watch the development of the doctrine as
it came under their influence. Probably the first instance of this question is to be
found, collaterally, in the famous Dartmouth College case of 1819.22 The "trust fund"
doctrine was rejected in Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen in 1929,23 but they
proceeded to replace this with the "implied waiver-negligent selection" doctrine, as
enunciated in the Powers case in 1899.24 In 1929, they thought that they were helpless
in the face of a rule of public policy for immunity which was so well settled that it
could not be questioned or overturned.2 5 It is of interest to note that the case used
to support their decision at this point was a South Carolina case. 26 South Carolina
is admittedly a jurisdiction which bases immunity solely on reasons of public policy.
In 1934, the Circuit Court of Appeals 27 affrmed the decision of the District Court
of Virginia, 28 and reiterated the rule that the federal courts will follow its own
decisions as laying down applicable law, in the absence of decisions of local courts
deciding the exact question contra. In this instance the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.29 Finally, in 1940, the District Court of Pennsylvania"0 said that liability
is the general rule, and that exceptions will be made only where the nature of the
organization sought to be charged therewith dictates otherwise or parties expressly3'
contract contrarily. The court then went on to reject the "trust fund," the "nonrespon-
deat superior," and "implied waiver" doctrines, which have been described as but
variations of the same thing, but left open the question of immunity based on public
"'Supra note 13, p. 824; cf. Feezer, supra note 9, p. 206.
,0109 F. 294 (1st Cir., 1899).
"Calif. (prior to 1951), Idaho and Nev. have used the doctrine of implied waiver, and Ariz.,
Kans., Utah, Wash. and Wyo. have used the doctrine of negligent selection.
Ore. and Colo. have used the doctrine of the "trust fund."
Okla. and Calif. (post 1951) have extended liability without qualification.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518 (1819). This case is
usually regarded as a constitutional-law case, but, Story, J., established therein the difference
between public and private corporations.
2334 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir., 1929).
"Note 20 supra.
"'Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph Macon College, 31 F.2d 869 (4th Cir., 1929).
'Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197,88 S.E. 649 (1916).
2"Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Assn., 68 F.2d 507 (4th Cir., 1934).
"Ibid., 5 F.Supp. 526 (D.C. Va., 1934).
291bid., 292 U.S. 629 (1933).
'0Lichty v. Carbon County Agricultural Assn., 31 F.Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa., 1940).
"Notice the change in language from the Putnam case, supra note 23, which extended immunity
on a doctrine of implied waiver.
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interest-sovereign function.32  Ultimately, in 1942, 33 Rutledge, J., deciding the
question of liability of charitable corporations for the torts of their servants resulting
in damage to strangers, said that it did not matter whether the injured party were
a "stranger" or a "beneficiary." 34
This line of cases indicates the trend of decision in the American jurisdictions,
a position already attained in the English and Dominion courts.
The second major question raised in the principal case is the question of imposing
liability upon charitable institutions when the injured party has suffered damage
as a result of the charitable institution's violation of a statute and local ordinance.
The liability of an owner under such statute is to the municipality alone, to the extent
of the fine or penalty prescribed thereby, and any breach of the duty thus owing
by the property owner to the municipality does not constitute negligence per se or
negligence to a third person.3 5
This was the position argued for by the majority opinion in the principal case,
saying that if the charity is obliged to pay for the cost of the repairs when made by
the municipality it will merely be paying for an improvement to its property or benefit
actually received, and there will be no improper diversion of its funds, but only an
expenditure similar to any other made by it for the purpose of keeping its property
in good order and repair.36
As intimated earlier, the one principle of immunity which is seldom used, and
which, in light of the modern trend of cases, is probably the last open and apparently
clear path for those desiring to maintain an immunity for charitable funds, is the
principle of "public interest-sovereign function." This principle is as old as the state-
ment that "The king can do no wrong!" Though many of the governmental units
have, by legislation, provided for the bringing of suit against the government, the
language of such legislation is always strictly construed.
This avenue of approach has by no means been closed. In fact, in jurisdictions
of immediate importance, e.g., California, the way has been left clear.37
It is significant to observe that the three cases which usually touch off any
discussion of charitable immunity from tort liability, e.g., Duncan v. Findlater, Feoffees
of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, and Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs,3a were all cases
which, though interpreted as bases for many and diverse principles, actually turned
on the question of whether they were such agencies as were imbued with a public
interest.3 9
Liability of municipal corporations is neither the general rule nor actually an
exception to the general rule. Liability must largely turn on the nature of the partic-
ular function being undertaken by the municipality at the time injury was done to
""Before this court could grant immunity on this (sovereign function) doctrine, the organ-
ization involved would have to be more closely allied with governmental functions."
"President & Directors of Georgetown College, supra note 13.
""Whether the one or the other is denied recovery, the distinction is without justice or legal
justification. Retention for the nonpaying patient is the least defensible and most unfortunate of
the distinction's refinements." Note 13 supra, at 827.
"Cf. note, 3 HAST. L.J. 73 (1951).
"Supra note 1, p. 331.
"TPa., supra note 4: "It is one of the recognized functions of municipal government to suppress
and extinguish fires."
Federal, supra note 48.
Calif., People v. San Joaquin, etc., Assn., 151 Cal. 797, 91 P. 740 (1907). Provided that the
institution is under the exclusive control and management of the state.
"Supra notes 6, 7 and 9.
"The reader is specifically referred to the very erudite discussion of McCaskill, supra note 7.
